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Constitutional Law and the Presidential Nomination Process
Richard Briffault*
Forthcoming in
THE BEST CANDIDATE: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IN POLARIZED TIMES
(Eugene D. Mazo and Michael R. Dimino, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2020)
Abstract
The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has had little
direct role in its evolution from congressional caucuses to party national conventions to our current
primary-dominated system. Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the
principal actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future
changes.
The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two axes:
government-party, and state-national. The government-party dimension focuses on the tension
between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and administering the
electoral process -- which may include the primary elections that determine the nominees of the
political parties – and the right of the parties to determine how to pick their nominees. Doctrinally,
this involves Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile the power of the states to write the rules for
state-run elections, including the primary elections that decide party nominations, with the
freedom of political association guaranteed to the parties under the First Amendment.
This government-party axis affects all nominations for state and federal office.
Presidential nominations, however, are distinct. For most elections, federal as well as state, most
of the rules are determined by state law. But presidential nominations involve a national-level
party decision for a nation-wide office. As a result, national party rules and federal laws factor into
shaping the nomination process and add the possibility of conflicts between national- and statelevel rules to the more common government-party tensions. Key Supreme Court rulings have held
that national party rules and the decisions of the national party conventions take precedence over
conflicting state laws and state party decisions. To date, Congress has played a minimal role in
this area, and its authority to regulate the nomination process has been contested, but its powers
need to be understood if Congress is to be involved in reforming this process.
The chapter concludes by suggesting that although the multiplicity of constitutionallyempowered actors may be – and has been – a source of conflict and complexity in the presidential
nomination process, it may also be a strength. By permitting so many avenues for change, the
constitutional framework creates multiple openings for reform.

*
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I.

Introduction
The Constitution says nothing about the presidential nominating process and has

had little direct role in the evolution of that process from congressional caucuses to party
national conventions to our current primary-dominated system of selecting convention
delegates.1 Yet, constitutional law is a factor in empowering and constraining the principal
actors in the nomination process and in shaping the framework for potential future
changes.
The constitutional law of the presidential nomination process operates along two
axes: government-party, and state-national. The government-party dimension focuses
on the tension between the states and the federal government in writing the rules for and
administering the electoral process -- which may include the primary elections that
determine the nominees of the political parties – and the right of the parties to determine
how to pick their nominees. This government-party axis affects all nominations of
candidates for state and federal office. Presidential nominations, however, are distinct.
For most elections, federal as well as state, most of the rules are determined by state law.
But presidential nominations involve a national-level party decision for a nation-wide
office. As a result, national party rules and federal laws factor into shaping the nomination
process and add the possibility of conflicts between national- and state-level rules to the
more common government-party tensions.
This chapter reviews the constitutional context for the presidential nomination
process and its implication for reforms. Part II considers the government-party axis, and
especially the Supreme Court’s efforts to reconcile the power of state governments to
write the rules for state-run elections, including the primary elections that decide party
nominations, with the freedom of political association guaranteed to the parties under the
First Amendment.2

1

On the evolution of the presidential nomination process, see generally Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes,
Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647,
652‒66 (2018).
2
Technically, in cases dealing with state law, the courts are applying the First Amendment as incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter will refer to these as First Amendment cases.
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Part III add national concerns to the mix. It examines the key Supreme Court
rulings holding that national party rules and the decisions of the national party conventions
take precedence over conflicting state laws and state party decisions. Part IV completes
the treatment of the state-national dimension by considering the power of Congress to
regulate the presidential nominating process. To date, Congress has played a minimal
role in this area, and its authority to regulate the nomination process has been contested,
but its powers are important to understand if Congress is to be involved in reforming this
process.
Part V concludes by suggesting that although the multiplicity of constitutionallyempowered actors may be – and has been – a source of conflict and complexity in the
presidential nomination process, it may also be a strength. By permitting so many
avenues for change, the constitutional framework creates multiple openings for reform.
II.

The Political Parties, Party Nominations, and the States
The Constitution says nothing about political parties. Indeed, as Madison’s

concerns in Federalist No. 10 about “the mischiefs of faction”3 and Washington’s
denunciation in his Farewell Address of the “common and continual mischiefs of the spirit
of party”4 both suggest, the Framers were hostile to political parties. Nonetheless, political
parties quickly emerged, and they played a crucial role in presidential elections as early
as 1800. By the late nineteenth century, our political process was thoroughly dominated
by organized political parties. As private organizations, these political parties initially
operated outside the scope of legal regulation. That began to change in the closing
decades of the nineteenth century with the adoption of official state ballots.
A. State Regulation of the Party Nomination Process
At one time, it was common for the parties to print their own ballots and then try to
persuade voters to take the party’s ballot into the polls. As the Supreme Court put it,
“[a]pproaching the polling place under this system was akin to entering an open auction
place. As the elector started his journey to the polls, he was met by various party ticket
3

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp.
Transcript of President George Washington’s Farewell Address, OURDOCUMENTS.GOV (Sept. 17, 1796),
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=15&page=transcript.
4
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peddlers ‘who were only too anxious to supply him with their party tickets.’ Often the
competition became heated when several such peddlers found an uncommitted or
wavering voter.”5 To combat the resulting problems of “voter intimidation and fraud,”
between about 1888 and 1896 virtually all of the states adopted the reform, first made
popular in Australia, of requiring voters to use a ballot printed by the state.6 But that meant
the states had to decide which candidates or parties would be listed on that ballot. That,
in turn, led the states to take a greater role in overseeing and, ultimately, mandating the
procedures that the parties use to select their nominees.
In most states, that state-mandated procedure became the party primary. In the
South, the party primary was a device for evading the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on
racial discrimination in voting. As the primary was considered to be an internal party
election, the Supreme Court held that a primary vote was not a “vote” within the meaning
of the Constitution.7 In the North and West, by contrast, the primary was a progressive
reform that provided a means of challenging party bosses’ control of the nomination
process.8 When challenged in state courts, primary requirements were generally
sustained as promoting party integrity, preventing “fraud or oppression,” and “increasing
the power of the people to govern their parties.”9 The party primary also provided an
opportunity for an actual competitive election in the many one-party states.10 Primaries
were hailed as a mechanism for combatting the corrupt domination of party bosses and
for vindicating the right to vote by extending it to the nomination process.11

5

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S, 191, 202 (1992).
Id. at 200‒02.
7
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). States laws that
mandated the exclusion of African-Americans from party primaries were held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). But when the exclusion resulted from a party rule, it was a matter of
private activity, not state action.
8
See, e.g., New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205 (2008) (states “set their faces
against ‘party bosses’ by requiring party-candidate selection through processes more favorable to insurgents, such as
primaries”).
9
See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 196‒200 (1982).
10
See LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN MOLD 129‒30, 171 (1986). As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court observed in an 1886 decision, “[i]n many portions of the state, as is well known, a nomination by a
convention of one of the parties is practically the equivalent of an election. In some instances, it is the precise
equivalent.” Leonard v. Commonwealth, 4 A. 220, 225 (Pa. 1886).
11
See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation in the State Courts,
1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2000).
6
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State primary laws were often accompanied by other measures that required
certain forms of party organization, structures, and procedures for the selection of both
party officers and party nominees but that also typically guaranteed the leading parties
placement on state ballots. The states came to treat the major parties as institutions akin
to public utilities – they were powerful entities that dominated political competition and
provided an essential public service in organizing the electoral process but also needed
to be overseen and regulated in order to protect the “democratic legitimacy” of that
process.12
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized this “public utility” model in 1941, in
United States v. Classic,13 which disavowed the Court’s prior position that a party primary
is simply the internal procedure of a private organization. Classic held that the federal law
criminalizing fraud in elections to federal office applied to Louisiana’s congressional
primary. As the Court explained, the primary “was conducted by the state at public
expense,”14 and was “an integral part of the procedure” that Louisiana had chosen for the
election of members of Congress.15 Indeed, “the practical influence of the choice of
candidates at the primary may be so great as to affect profoundly the choice at the general
election.”16 As a result, the Court in Classic held that Congress’s power under Article I,
Section 4 of the Constitution to regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding
elections” for members of Congress includes the power to regulate the party primaries
that select the nominees who run in congressional elections.17
Three years later, in Smith v. Allwright,18 the Court observed that, due to Classic,
“[i]t may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in . . . a primary for the
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote in a
general election, is a right secured by the Constitution.”19 Smith held that the Texas
Democratic party could not exclude African-Americans from participating in its primary.

12

See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 173‒74.
313 U.S. 299 (1941).
14
Id. at 311.
15
Id. at 314.
16
Id. at 319.
17
Id. at 319‒21.
18
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
19
Id. at 661‒62.
13
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Although such exclusion was due to a party rule, and not a state law, it was still “state
action,” so that the Constitution’s ban on racial discrimination in voting applied. Given the
many state laws governing the internal structure of the party and the procedures for
making party decisions, the party was “an agency of the state in so far as it determines
the participants in a primary election.”20 Moreover, by making primaries “a part of the
machinery for choosing officials, state and national” and “prescrib[ing] a general election
ballot made up of party nominees . . . chosen” in primaries, the state had effectively
“endorse[d], adopt[ed], and enforce[d]” the party’s racial discrimination.21 The Court
concluded that although, as a matter of internal autonomy, the party could set its own
rules for membership, when party membership became “the essential qualification for
voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action
of the party the action of the state.”22
Nine years later, in Terry v. Adams,23 the Court held that the internal elections of
a Texas county political association which were open only to the county’s white voters,
and which, over a sixty-year period, effectively determined the winners of the Democratic
primary and the general election, also constituted state action. There was no single
opinion for the Court but the justices who composed the majority looked to the power of
the party organization,24 the state’s acceptance and ratification of that power,25 and its de
facto incorporation into the decision-making of the county Democratic Party. The party
organization had become part of the “electoral apparatus” of the state, and, thus, was
subject to the constitutional anti-discrimination requirements that apply to state action.26
Four decades later, in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,27 the Court held that
the preclearance provision of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act – which required
Department of Justice approval of any new “standard, practice or procedure with respect

20

Id. at 662‒63.
Id. at 664.
22
Id. at 664‒65.
23
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
24
Id. at 463‒70 (opinion of Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton); id. at 484 (opinion of Justice
Clark, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson).
25
Id. at 468‒70.
26
Id. at 484.
27
517 U.S 186 (1996).
21
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to voting” adopted by a “covered jurisdiction” – applied to the Virginia Republican Party’s
decision to impose a registration fee on anyone who wanted to become a delegate to the
party convention that was called to nominate a candidate for the United States Senate.28
Although there was no majority opinion for the Court, the two opinions that together made
a majority relied on Smith and Terry in concluding that the party exercises a power
delegated to it by the state when it chooses a nominee who will later appear, pursuant to
state law, on the state’s general election ballot. As a result, when the state places the
candidate chosen by the convention on the ballot, “it ‘endorses, adopts and enforces’ the
delegate qualifications set by the party.”29
B. First Amendment Protection of the Party Nomination Process
Starting In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court began to voice a new theme
in its treatment of the political parties by emphasizing that parties are political associations
that enjoy the freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Moreover, the
selection of a party’s general-election nominees was deemed to be at the core of the
party’s First Amendment rights.
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,30 the Court held that the
Connecticut law requiring that a party choose its nominees in a closed primary – that is,
one limited to party members – unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment rights
of a party that wanted to open its primary to independent voters, that is, voters not
registered with any party. The state law, the Court determined, “place[d] limits upon the
group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the ‘basic function’
of selecting the Party’s candidates.”31 The state’s action “thus limit[ed] the Party’s
associational opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common
principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the

At the time Morse was decided, Virginia was a “covered jurisdiction,” subject to the preclearance requirement of
the Voting Rights Act. Two decades later, the Court struck down the provision of the Voting Rights Act setting the
formula for the determination of covered jurisdictions, thus effectively terminating the preclearance requirement.
See Shelby Co. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
29
Morse, 517 U.S. at 197‒200 (opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg). See also id. at 235, 239
(opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, citing Smith as authority for application of
Voting Rights Act to party nomination processes). See also id. at 212-18, 236-40 (citing Terry).
30
479 U.S. 208 (1986).
31
Id. at 216.
28
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community.”32 The Court subjected the imposition of the closed primary requirement to
strict judicial scrutiny, and concluded that it was not narrowly tailored to promoting a
compelling state interest. The Court found one of the justifications the state offered –
ensuring the administrability of the primary system – was not compelling, while the others
-- avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the responsibility of party government – were
not advanced by the closed primary requirement.33
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,34 the Court struck
down a law that barred the governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates
in party primaries. The endorsement ban sought to reduce the role that the party
organization had over the selection of party nominees, and it reflected the same goal that
was the impetus behind forcing parties to hold primaries. But the Court nonetheless found
that the ban interfered with the ability of the party to “select a ‘standard bearer who best
represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’”35
And in California Democratic Party v. Jones,36 the Court invalidated California’s
blanket primary law, adopted by voter initiative, which would have allowed each voter to
vote in any party’s primary for each office on the ballot, including different party primaries
for different offices (e.g., a voter could potentially vote in the Democratic primary for
governor but in the Republican primary for attorney general). The Court reiterated that
“states have a major role to play in structuring and monitoring the election process,
including primaries,”37 but emphasized that “the processes by which political parties select
their nominees” are not “wholly public affairs that the state may regulate freely.” Rather,
the First Amendment “reserves” a “special place” and accords “special protection” to “the
process by which a political party ‘select[s] a standard bearer who best represents the
party’s ideologies and preferences.’”38 The blanket primary severely burdened party First
Amendment rights by allowing those who “at best, have refused to affiliate with the party,

32

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 217‒24.
34
489 U.S. 214 (1989).
35
Id. at 224.
36
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
37
Id. at 572.
38
Id. at 572‒75.
33
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and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival” to participate in the party’s nomination
process.39 That could change both the identity of a party’s nominee and the policy
positions its candidates take, effectively “adulterat[ing]” the party’s candidate selection
process. “We can think of no heavier burden on a political party’s associational freedom,”
the Court wrote. It then determined that the principal justifications advanced for the
blanket primary – making party nominees more representative of the general electorate
and allowing otherwise “disenfranchised voters” to participate in the primary process –
were not compelling.40 Indeed, these justifications were actually inconsistent with the
rights of parties and party members to select their own nominees. Other justifications –
such as that the blanket primary would be “fairer” to nonparty members in districts
effectively controlled by one party, and that the blanket primary protected political privacy
by enabling voters to participate in a primary without having to formally declare affiliation
with a party – were dismissed as either non-compelling or capable of being satisfied by a
less burdensome mechanism than the blanket primary.41
The Court in Jones stressed that its concern was with the state’s opening the
party’s nomination process to non-party members. The state could still structure the ballot
to facilitate participation by non-party voters in the selection of general-election
candidates by creating a nonpartisan -- or “top two” -- primary in which all candidates for
an office run on the same ballot regardless of party affiliation, and all voters can vote in
that election, with the top two vote-getters moving on to the general election.42 In such a
primary, non-party voters would not actually be picking a party’s nominee, and the party
would be free to use its own internal processes for endorsing its preferred candidate.
Indeed, in 2010 California voters passed a ballot proposition creating such a top-two
system for congressional and state-level elections.43
C. An Uncertain Synthesis

39

Id. at 577.
Id. at 579‒82.
41
Id. at 582‒86.
42
Id. at 585‒86.
43
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5.
40
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States have the constitutional power to regulate their elections, including elections
for federal offices; to set the terms for the placement of parties and candidates on the
state’s ballot; and, as a result, to regulate the process by which parties determine their
nominees. States can also use this power to promote other goals, such as the integrity
and stability of the political party system.44 Yet, the parties, as political associations, are
protected by the First Amendment, and that protection extends to the party’s selection of
its nominees to contest the general election. These two constitutional norms do not easily
fit together. In recent years, the doctrinal pendulum, which had swung first towards
treating the parties as subject to state regulation and then towards a recognition of parties
as bearers of First Amendment rights, appears to be swinging at least moderately back
towards affirming state regulatory authority.
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,45 the Court upheld Minnesota’s “antifusion” law that prohibited a party from nominating a candidate who had been nominated
by another party. A few years later, in Clingman v. Beaver,46 the Court rejected a party’s
argument that a state’s semi-closed primary law, which permitted participation by party
members and independent voters, but not voters registered with another party, violated
the party’s First Amendment right to choose to open its primary fully to voters registered
with other parties. In both cases, the unsuccessful plaintiff was a minor party, so the
results may be chalked up to the Court’s preference for the two-party system47 and its
implicit hostility to minor parties.48 But the Court’s mode of analysis was not limited to
minor parties. Instead, in both cases, the Court applied the so-called Anderson-Burdick
balancing test, which It developed to deal with challenges brought by candidates and
voters to state election regulations.49 Anderson-Burdick reflects the judgment that “States
may, and inevitably must, enact regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce
election- and campaign-related disorder,”50 even though those regulations will also
44

See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
520 U.S. 351 (1997).
46
544 U.S. 581 (2005).
47
See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. at 367 (1997).
48
See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
49
Anderson-Burdick derives from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), in which an independent candidate
sought a place on the general election ballot, and from Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), which considered a
voter’s claim to cast, and have counted, a write-in ballot in the state’s general election.
50
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358.
45
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inevitably burden First Amendment associational rights. When an election regulation is
challenged, the Court will first assess the “character and magnitude” of the burden of the
state’s rule. If the burden is severe, the law will have to be narrowly tailored to advancing
a compelling state interest. But “[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review” and
“‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”51
The preliminary determination of the magnitude of the burden of the state’s law on
protected associational freedom is key. In both Timmons and Clingman, the Court found
the burdens to be relatively modest. Timmons reasoned that in light of the general laws
that limit the eligibility of candidates, a party does not have an absolute right to nominate
any particular candidate it wants. Moreover, although the anti-fusion law barred the party
from nominating its preferred candidate, it was still free to endorse and support him.52
This certainly seems in tension with the Court’s prior decisions that had emphasized the
vital importance of the party nominee as the “standard bearer who best represents the
party’s ideologies and preferences.”53 In Clingman, four members of the Court’s majority
did not find that the limit on the party’s right to open its primary to non-members was much
of a burden on the associational rights of the party at all.54 The other two justices in the
majority acknowledged that some “significant associational interests [were] at stake” but
thought the burden imposed by a semi-closed primary was “modest and politically neutral”
as it barred only those voters who had chosen to affiliate with another party from
participating in the plaintiff party’s primary.55 Again, this is hard to square with Tashjian’s
emphasis on the party’s interest in determining who can vote in its primary. Both Timmons
and Clingman found the laws at issue were justified by the general state interests in the
stability of the party system56 and in maintaining the integrity of political parties as “viable

51

Id.
Id. at 359‒60.
53
See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989).
54
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. at 587‒91 (plurality opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy).
55
Id. at 602‒04 (opinion of Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer).
56
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366‒70.
52
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and identifiable interest groups,”57 even when political parties actually opposed those
notionally pro-party rules.
In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 58 the Court
employed the Anderson-Burdick standard to assess a First Amendment challenge
brought by a major party. In the aftermath of California Democratic Party v Jones,
Washington voters adopted a top-two primary system, but that law allowed a candidate
to indicate a “party preference” on the ballot.59 The state’s Republican Party sued,
claiming that the “party preference” provision violated the party’s constitutional rights
because voters would associate a candidate with the party of his or her stated party
preference even for “a candidate who is unaffiliated with” the party “or even repugnant to”
it.60 Stressing that the party was bringing only a facial challenge, the Court concluded that
the party had failed to provide the evidence necessary to prove that the “party preference”
provision would inevitably be a severe burden on its associational rights.61 As a result,
the state only had to show that the party preference provision served an “important
regulatory interest.” The Court agreed with the state that the interest in providing voters
with information about the candidates on the ballot was such an interest.62 Washington
Grange was less clearly at odds with the view that the First Amendment protects party
control over the nomination process than Timmons or Clingman but all three decisions
certainly reflect the Court’s continuing commitment to giving the states significant control
over their primaries.
The strong statements in Tashjian, Eu, and Jones concerning the fundamental
importance of the nomination process to party autonomy implicitly challenge the power of
the states to mandate the use of a primary election to choose party nominees. In
American Party of Texas v. White63 -- decided before the leading party autonomy cases
-- the Court declared that “it is too plain for argument . . . that the State . . . may insist

57

Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593‒94.
552 U.S. 442 (2008).
59
Id. at 444.
60
Id. at 447.
61
Id. at 454‒58.
62
Id. at 458.
63
415 U.S. 767 (1974).
58
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that intraparty competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by
party convention.”64 But the power to require a primary was not at issue in White, which
concerned a Texas law that provided for different nomination processes for minor and
new parties as opposed to the established major parties. The Court repeated American
Party’s “too plain for argument” line in Jones65 and more recently in New York State Board
of Elections v. Lopez Torres,66 although again a state’s power to mandate a primary was
not at issue in either case.67 Indeed, the Court has never addressed a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of the mandatory primary or explained how it squares with a party’s
powerful First Amendment interest in deciding the selection of its nominees. Lopez
Torres, which turned back a challenge to New York’s hybrid primary-and-convention
system for selecting judicial candidates, gestured at a reason for the constitutionality of a
primary requirement when it linked state regulation of the nomination process to the
state’s decision to “give[] the party a role in the election process . . . by giving certain
parties the right to have their candidates appear with party endorsement on the generalelection ballot.”68 But even then the Court noted that the state’s power was limited by the
First Amendment, citing the trio of Tashjian, Eu, and Jones.69
The constitutionality of the primary requirement was implicated in two post-Jones
federal court of appeals decisions. In Alaska Independence Party v. Alaska,70 two minor
parties challenged the Alaska law allowing any voter registered with a party – and any
voter could choose to register with any party -- to seek that party’s nomination. The parties
expressed the concern that because they could not control who registers with them and
thus who may run for their nominations, the primary law prevented them from excluding
candidates they found objectionable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, observed that the very purpose of the direct primary requirement is to shift
control over the nomination process from “party leadership” to “rank-and-file party voters.”

64

Id. at 781.
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 657, 572 (2000).
66
552 U.S. 196, 203 (2008).
67
See also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 486 U.S. 208, 237 (1986) (Scalia, J. dissenting, quoting and
citing the line from American Party).
68
Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203.
69
Id.
70
545 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2008).
65
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As candidacy was limited to those who had chosen to affiliate with the party, and the party
leadership remained free to endorse its preferred candidates and disavow undesired
candidates, the court determined that the law’s burden on party autonomy was modest.
Even if it could be considered severe, “the state’s interest in eliminating the fraud and
corruption

that

frequently

accompanied

party-run

nominating

conventions

is

compelling.”71
In 2018, Utah Republican Party v. Cox72 vindicated a state’s authority, in the face
of a First Amendment objection, to alter a party’s nomination process. Utah Republican
Party rules provided for nominations by a convention composed of delegates elected at
neighborhood caucuses. If a candidate won more than sixty percent of the convention
vote, there would be no primary; if no candidate won sixty percent at the convention, there
would be a primary limited to the two candidates who got the most convention votes.
Utah’s Republican-controlled legislature, however, passed a new law enabling any
candidate who collected a qualifying number of petition signatures from party voters to
participate in the primary, whether or not that candidate had sought the nomination in the
convention or had been one of the top two convention candidates. 73 The Tenth Circuit
rejected the state party organization’s claim that this state-directed change to the
nomination process severely burdened its freedom of association. In the court’s view, the
law was not an attack on party autonomy but a determination by the “overwhelmingly”
Republican legislature of who actually spoke for the party – the relatively small group of
activists who participate in the caucus-and-convention process, or the “roughly 600,000
registered Republicans”74 eligible to participate in the primary. With the primary limited to
party voters, the court’s majority saw little burden on associational rights,75 and concluded
the law was justified by the state’s interests in increasing voter participation and access
to the ballot.76 However, the dissent found that by superseding the party’s rules, the
71
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primary law necessarily interfered with party autonomy. The dissent also emphasized the
tension between the mandatory primary and the Supreme Court’s recognition of party
autonomy in cases like Jones,77 and contended that the “behemoth, corrupt party
machines” invoked to justify mandatory primaries are a thing of the past. Indeed, the
dissent urged the Supreme Court to directly address the constitutionality of the mandatory
primary in light of the cases emphasizing party associational rights.78 The Supreme Court,
however, denied certiorari.79
Assuming a mandatory primary is constitutional, open primaries, as fifteen states
require for at least some elections,80 may be subject to challenge. Jones noted that an
open primary “may be constitutionally distinct” from the invalidated blanket primary as
“the voter is limited to one party’s ballot,” but Jones was also careful to say that it was not
passing on the constitutionality of open primaries.81 Moreover, the same concern of
compelling party members to associate with non-members in the nomination process that
was at issue in Jones is surely implicated by the open primary, in which any registered
voter is entitled to vote, regardless of the voter’s party affiliation. In the handful of
challenges to open primary laws since Jones, the lower federal courts have generally
been reluctant to find open primary laws facially unconstitutional,82 but several have left
open the possibility of as-applied challenges, and at least two courts have sustained those
challenges when the parties provided evidence that there was likely to be a sufficiently
high level of “cross-over voting” – that is, voting by members of other parties – to affect
the nomination.83 That would be a “severe burden” on the party’s freedom of association,
not justified by any compelling state interest.
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***
The constitutional tension between a state’s control of its elections and a party’s
autonomy with respect to the selection of its nominees remains unresolved, at least in
theory. In practice, the constitutionality of the mandatory primary seems settled. This may
be due to the state’s power to make the automatic listing of party nominees on the general
election ballot contingent on the party’s use of the primary to select its nominees. It may
also reflect the sense that at least when the primary is limited to party voters, the state is
not burdening freedom of association but protecting the rights of association members to
be heard. The tension becomes sharper when the state requires the party to allow nonparty members to participate in the primary process over the party’s objection. There have
been relatively few cases dealing with this issue, perhaps because the parties -- or at
least the major parties – are likely to have considerable influence with their state
legislatures, so that laws the party organizations oppose will not often be enacted,
although the recent Utah dispute is a clear counterexample. In the few cases that have
arisen, courts have first looked to the states’ power to structure their elections, including
the regulation of party nominations, and have placed the burden on the challengers to
prove that the state-determined voting rule severely infringes their associational rights. In
a handful of cases, parties have been able to carry that burden, and it is possible that
there will be more challenges in the future.
III.

The Constitutional Status of National Party Rules and Conventions
Although the balance of constitutional power between government and party with

respect to party nominations remains uncertain in state-level elections, in a trio of cases
decided between 1972 and 1981, the Supreme Court made it clear that when it comes to
the presidential nomination process, national party rules and the decisions of national
party conventions take precedence over the rules and decisions of state-level actors.
These decisions swept aside the nascent tendency, evidenced most clearly in a pair of
decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
1971, to extend the Smith/Terry treatment of the party nomination process as state action
to the national conventions. Those D.C. Circuit decisions involved challenges, brought
under the “one person, one vote” doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
16
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Protection Clause, to how the national parties allocated delegates across the states to
the 1972 national conventions. Although the D.C. Circuit panels ultimately concluded the
parties had not violated “one person, one vote,” both cases agreed that a decision made
by parties at the national level “is tantamount to a decision of the States acting in concert
and therefore subject to constitutional standards applicable to state action,” and that
“there is no doubt that the allocation among the States of delegates to a party national
convention is subject to the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”84
Beginning in 1972, however, the Supreme Court determined that the state
action/public utility model does not apply to the national conventions and national party
rules. In O’Brien v. Brown,85 the Court addressed two controversies concerning the
seating of competing delegations to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. The
Illinois delegation had been elected in violation of guidelines adopted by the Democratic
National Committee the year before, while the California delegation was entirely pledged
to the winner of that state’s winner-take-all primary, in violation of the mandate of the 1968
Democratic National Convention calling for the elimination of winner-take-all rules. The
Convention’s Credentials Committee had recommended unseating the Illinois delegation
and 151 of the 271 California delegates. Suits were brought challenging both decisions.
The D.C. Circuit sustained the district court’s dismissal of the claim brought by the Illinois
delegation, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of the California claim, and petitions
for certiorari and requests for stays were filed with the Supreme Court in both cases.
Acting on the very eve of the Convention, the Supreme Court stayed the judgments
of the court of appeals. In a brief opinion, the Court underscored the status of “our national
political parties . . . as voluntary associations of individuals,” and noted that whether there
was either state action or a justiciable issue was uncertain “in this unique context.” The
Court cautioned against the judiciary acting “to interject itself into the deliberative
processes of a national political convention.” Instead, it found the “convention itself . . .
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the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be
seated.”86
The Illinois delegation’s dispute was back before the Court more than two years
later in Cousins v. Wigoda,87 which grew out of the Illinois state court litigation between
the delegates who had won election in the March 1972 Illinois Democratic primary (“the
Wigoda delegates”) and the alternative delegation (“the Cousins delegates”) who had
argued that the procedures used to elect the Wigoda delegation violated the national
party’s guidelines. The Wigoda delegates won a state court order enjoining the Cousins
group from serving as delegates at the Convention. Nonetheless, the Convention voted
to seat the Cousins delegation. An Illinois appellate court subsequently affirmed the
injunction previously issued by the state court, finding that the election of convention
delegates was “governed by non-discriminatory state legislation” which reflected the
“interest of the state in protecting the effective right to participate in primaries” and, thus,
took “primacy . . . over the decisions of a national political party convention.” 88 The
Supreme Court reversed in an opinion which emphasized the special nature of a
presidential nomination as a nation-level decision.
The Court acknowledged that Illinois has “a compelling interest in protecting the
right of its electoral processes and the right of its citizens . . . to effective suffrage,” but
pointed to “the significant fact that the suffrage was exercised at the primary election to
elect delegates to a National Party Convention.” That necessarily reduced the weight of
the state’s interest, as convention delegates “perform a task of supreme importance to
every citizen of the Nation regardless of their State of residence.”89 The Court minimized
the state’s stake in the selection of convention delegates, noting “[t]he States themselves
have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates,” and then expressed the concern that requiring
deference to state law left open the possibility of each state establishing its own
qualifications without regard to party policy, “an obviously intolerable result.” Instead, the

86

Id. at 4.
419 U.S. 477 (1975).
88
Wigoda v. Cousins, 302 N.E.2d 614, 627 (Ill. App. 1973).
89
Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 489.
87

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499733

matter ought to be left to the Convention, “which serves the pervasive national interest in
the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than
any interest of an individual State.”90
A third Supreme Court decision confirmed the primacy of national party decisions
over state law and state parties with respect to the presidential nomination process. The
national Democratic Party’s rules for the selection of delegates to the 1980 National
Convention provided that participation in the delegate selection process must be limited
to registered Democrats. Since 1903, however, Wisconsin’s election law had provided for
state primaries to be open to all registered voters, and the state – including the state
Democratic Party – was unwilling to change this law. The state attorney general (a
Democrat) sued the Democratic National Committee on behalf of the state, seeking a
declaration that the national Democrats could not refuse to seat a Wisconsin delegation
elected through an open primary. The Wisconsin Democratic Party, although technically
also a defendant, also sued the national party for an order requiring the national party to
recognize the delegates selected according to Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court entered a judgment for the state and the state party.
In Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel LaFollette,91 the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a State, or a court, may not constitutionally
substitute its own judgment for that of the Party. A political party’s choice among the
various ways of determining the makeup of a State’s delegation to the party’s national
convention is protected by the Constitution.”92 Wisconsin had a “substantial interest in the
manner in which its elections are conducted”93 and was free to hold an open primary, but
it could not compel the national party to seat a delegation selected by a procedure that
violated national party rules, nor could it compel Wisconsin delegates to vote according
to the results of the state primary if that would violate party rules.94
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LaFollette was the last time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status
of national party rules and national nominating conventions, and the message of O’Brien,
Cousins and LaFollette taken together is clear. National political parties are unique
entities, not analogous to the state actors in White and Terry, and their rules and decisions
take precedence over conflicting state laws, state party preferences, and state court
decisions. The doctrine resulting from these cases is so well-defined that there have been
few significant cases dealing with national conventions or national parties since
LaFollette. Indeed, immediately following Cousins, the D.C. Circuit reconsidered its
approach to the convention delegate allocation question, concluding that the “one person,
one vote” doctrine did not apply to the parties at all and “reserving” the question of state
action.95 Subsequently, an Eleventh Circuit panel, relying on LaFollette, dismissed as
nonjusticiable a challenge to a Florida Republican Party rule, adopted pursuant to a
national party directive concerning the apportionment of delegates within the state,96 and
the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge to a 1984 Democratic National Committee rule
requiring that state delegations to the national convention consist of equal numbers of
men and women, observing in the course of its analysis that “the efforts of the states to
regulate delegate selection have been consistently rebuffed.”97
In short, the national parties’ role in the presidential nomination process benefits
from their status as private associations protected by the First Amendment, and even
more so, at least relative to the states, as national actors engaged in a political process
of national significance.
IV.

The Constitutional Question of a Role for Congress
One aspect of the current presidential nomination system that has frequently been

criticized is the presidential primary timetable. The early dates of the first caucuses and
primaries (a problem known as front-loading98); the privileged position of small,
demographically unrepresentative states like Iowa and New Hampshire; and the
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seemingly random and unstable nature of the caucus and primary schedules have led to
calls for change. Possible reforms include a later start to the nomination calendar, rotating
which states get to host the first contests, or regional primaries. Recognizing the difficulty
of coordinating the laws of fifty states99 and the rules of the state and national parties,
some observers have called for federal legislation to address the presidential nomination
process while simultaneously also questioning whether Congress has the constitutional
authority to enact legislation regulating presidential nominations.100 This is not just a
matter of whether the parties’ First Amendment protection precludes congressional
regulation, but also whether as a matter of federalism Congress has any authority in this
area at all.
The source of the asserted federalism difficulty is the text of Article II, Section 1 of
the Constitution (as amended by the Twelfth Amendment), which establishes the
procedure for electing a president through the Electoral College, especially when
contrasted with the provisions of Article I, Section 4, which deals with congressional
elections. Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” equal to the number of its members
of Congress; limits the eligibility of who can serve as a presidential elector; lays out the
procedure for the Electoral College to vote, and, if the Electoral College fails to produce
a majority winner, for the House of Representatives to pick a president. (The Twelfth
Amendment modified the procedure to provide for the separate election of a president
and vice president.) Congress is authorized to “determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.” But other than this ability to set uniform days for the
selection of Electors and for the Electors to vote, Congress is given no other power at all
with respect to election of the Electoral College. Unless and until the Electoral College is
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unable to pick a majority winner, the presidential selection process established by the
Constitution is very state-centered.
The argument for very limited Congressional authority with respect to presidential
elections is bolstered by a comparison of Article II with the Constitution’s treatment of
congressional elections. Although Article I, Section 4 begins by stating that “[t]he Times,
Places and manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” it then goes on to provide that “the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.” As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, the “substantive
scope” of congressional power to regulate congressional elections is “broad.”101 Its
“comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections”102 and to supersede any inconsistent state law.103 As previously noted, United
States v. Classic extended that broad power to include the regulation of congressional
primaries. The absence of any such constitutional power for Congress to regulate the
election of presidential electors is striking, however, and has been cited as the basis for
doubting congressional authority to regulate the presidential nomination process.104
The textual silence of Article II, relative to Article I, notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court has recognized Congress’s power to regulate presidential elections. In Burroughs
v. United States,105 in 1932, the Court sustained the application of the campaign finance
disclosure provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 to a presidential
campaign committee. As the Court explained,
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of
his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect upon the welfare
and safety of the whole people cannot be too strongly stated. To say that Congress
is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital
particular the power of self-protection. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that
power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments
101
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and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or corruption.106

Citing Burroughs, the Supreme Court again “recognized broad Congressional power to
regulate in connection with the elections of the President and Vice President” in Buckley
v. Valeo,107 in which it generally upheld most of the contribution restrictions and disclosure
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act without distinguishing between the
law’s application to congressional elections as opposed to presidential elections.
Moreover, Buckley upheld the public funding provisions which dealt exclusively with
presidential elections, including presidential primaries and the presidential nominating
conventions.108 Indeed, federal campaign finance law,109 federal law dealing with fraud
and misconduct in federal elections,110 and other federal voting related measures have
all been applied by Congress to presidential elections.
The Supreme Court also invoked the unique national nature of the presidency and
presidential elections when it invalidated Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent
candidates in Anderson v. Celebrezze.111 As the Court noted, “in the context of a
Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national
interest. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected
officials who represent all the voters in the Nation. . . . Similarly, the State has a less
important interest in regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections,
because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by voters beyond the State’s
boundaries.”112 Although Anderson addressed only the limits on state regulatory power
rather than the existence or scope of national regulatory power, its implication is that if
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there is going to be regulation of presidential elections it should at least in part be national
in scope.
The foundation for congressional regulation of the presidential nomination process
is ultimately structural rather than any specific provision of constitutional text. As Justice
Black once put it, “inherent in the very concept of a supreme national government with
national officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those officers represent
their national constituency as responsively as possible. This power arises from the nature
of our constitutional system of government and from the Necessary and Proper
Clause.”113 Scholars have also found constitutional authority for congressional action in
Congress’s power to count the electoral votes (combined with the Necessary and Proper
Clause)114; the Times. Places, and Manner Clause that authorizes federal regulation of
congressional elections, as presidential elections are often held at the same time and on
the same ballots as congressional elections;115 and the Twelfth Amendment, which, it has
been argued, implicitly recognizes the role of political parties in presidential elections.116
Congressional power to regulate presidential nominations also likely includes the
power to impose obligations on the states. Although the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrine bars Congress from directing state legislatures to pass laws or
from requiring state and local officials to implement federal laws,117 several lower courts
have held that the anti-commandeering principle does not apply to federal laws, such as
the National Voter Registration Act, adopted pursuant to Congress’s Times, Places, and
Manner power.118 Assuming, as the Supreme Court indicated in Burroughs and Buckley,
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that congressional power to regulate presidential elections is comparable to its power to
regulate federal elections generally, the anti-commandeering doctrine ought not apply.
Congress, thus, ought to have as much power to regulate the presidential
nomination process as it has to regulate federal elections generally. The real constraint
on Congress, then, is not federalism but the First Amendment. As Part II has indicated,
the extent of that constraint is uncertain. The Supreme Court would likely apply the
Anderson-Burdick test, with the nature of the judicial review turning on the severity of the
legislative burden that congressional regulations would have on a political party’s freedom
of association. As Part II has also shown, what counts as a severe burden – and what
compelling interests might justify such a burden – is far from clear. It is tempting to
speculate that some congressional regulation of the nomination process, such as
changes to the timing and tempo of the nomination calendar, would not be seen as severe
(especially if not opposed by the national parties) and could be justified by the
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory” purpose of equalizing the influence of different states in
the nomination process or giving candidates more time to bring their campaigns to more
voters.119 Conversely, it seems likely that a federal effort to regulate the inner workings of
a Convention, such as by strengthening (or weakening) the influence of super-delegates,
would be seen as a severe burden as such a change would likely change the type of
candidate who gets nominated. But given the paucity of cases, and the tensions built into
the Supreme Court’s doctrine, these are necessarily speculative observations.
V.

Conclusion
As a recent Congressional Research Service study concluded, “[t]he presidential

nominating process is the single most complicated feature of the nation’s electoral
system, because it relies on national and state political party rules and practices, as well
as aspects of federal and state election laws.”120 Political scientist Elaine Kamarck has
also noted that “[n]o one is really in charge of the presidential nomination system; there
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is no ‘decider.’”121 This chapter’s review of Supreme Court doctrine necessarily focused
on the kinds of conflicts between participants in the process that generated contested
cases, but the process is marked by cooperation and bargaining as least as much as it is
by litigated conflict.122 The national parties may make exceptions to their rules to
accommodate recalcitrant states and state parties,123 and states and state parties may
change their practices in light of national party guidelines.
Moreover, although the lack of a single “decider” may complicate efforts to change
the nomination process, changes to the process do occur on an ongoing basis. Although
there has been no national solution to the front-loading problem, both national parties
now provide incentives to their state parties to move back their delegate selection events.
The national Democratic Party offers states that hold their primaries or caucuses later in
the nomination process a 15-20% increase in delegates,124 while the national Republican
Party allows states that hold later nomination contests to allocate delegates on a winnertake-all basis rather than the proportional representation rule required for states that go
earlier in the process.125 This appears to have had some effect. The peak year for frontloading was 2008, and since then we have seen the caucus and primary calendar moved
back a bit. Similarly, to promote “regional” primaries, which may reduce candidate costs
and better focus voter attention, the Democratic party offers states that hold their delegate
selection events on the same day as two other neighboring states a “cluster” bonus of
15% more delegates.126
Following the sharp criticisms voiced concerning the caucus system, particularly
the low rate of participation in caucuses (relative to primaries) and the difficulties of access
to the caucus process,127 the Democratic party changed its rules for the 2020 nomination
to encourage greater use of primaries, and most of the caucus states have followed suit.
As of the fall of 2019, at least ten of the fourteen states that held caucuses in 2016 have
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announced they will select their delegates to the 2020 convention by a primary, 128 so that
the percentage of pledged delegates selected by caucus will drop from fourteen percent
to less than five percent.129 These changes have also involved considerable innovation
by state parties and cooperation between the state parties and state governments. For
example, in four states – Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and North Dakota – the state
Democratic Party will be holding party-run (or “firehouse”) primaries. These will be
conducted by party officials, and they will involve balloting in places and at times chosen
by the party. Some of these party-run primaries will provide for unusual balloting
mechanisms including ranked choice voting and early voting.130
Even the venerable Iowa caucus, although still a caucus, is being reformed by
Iowa Democrats. The state party initially sought to expand participation by enabling
Democrats to phone in absentee votes, rating their presidential preferences in a ranked
choice style, with this virtual caucus taking place over six days. The Democratic National
Committee ultimately vetoed the virtual caucus plan, concluding that it was too vulnerable
to hacking.131 The state party then came up with a new plan, which the national party
approved, to create multiple “satellite” caucuses – which could be held in workplaces,
nursing homes, out-of-state college campuses, and even overseas community gathering
places and elsewhere – in addition to the precinct caucuses to accommodate people who
cannot attend the traditional in-precinct caucuses.132

See Geoffrey Skelley, How Will Democrats’ Move Away From Caucuses Affect the 2020 Race?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-will-democrats-move-away-fromcaucuses-affect-the-2020-race/.
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2019), http://frontloading.blogspot.com/2019/05/; Alaska Democrats Plan on April 4 Party-Run Primary,
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On the Republican side, the state parties have also been changing their rules,
albeit with the focus of not of expanding participation but of reducing the potential for
opposition to the renomination of President Trump. Several state parties have eliminated
the use of primaries or caucuses for selecting delegates or allocating them among
candidates, or if the primary or caucus process is still used for choosing delegates among
competing candidates raising the threshold of votes a candidate must receive in order to
be allocated delegates, or by cancelling outright

133

Overall, what is most striking when examining the actions of the national and state
parties and the state legislatures in preparing for the 2020 nominations is the degree of
cooperation among the various actors in writing and rewriting the rules for the selection
of convention delegates. New state-run primaries,134 changed primary dates,135
authorization to cancel primaries,136 the creation of party-run primaries,137 and the
expansion of participation in the caucus process in Iowa and Nevada,138 have all gone
forward without major litigation. Although the course of changing the presidential
nominating system is slow, messy, uneven, and uncertain, reforms do occur, even without
a single “decider.” Indeed, the process provides room for state-level and state- and partyspecific innovations that reflect distinctive state and party preferences and also respond
to and shape national trends.
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***
Unlike the presidential election process – with its entrenched Electoral College -the Constitution itself imposes no constraints on changing the presidential nomination
process. Moreover, the multiple potential actors empowered by constitutional law to
address the nomination process provide multiple avenues for seeking change. The real
obstacles to reforming the process are not constitutional but normative and political –
deciding what would be a better process, and figuring out how to work the political system
to get such a process adopted.
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